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Summary 
The objective and 
means of redistribution 
State redistribution fulfils three basic objectives: it 
creates funding for the production of public goods, it 
offsets failures of market distribution, and it 
improves equity of distribution. Equity of 
distribution may be improved through cash 
benefits, while price subsidies and benefits in kind 
may be used to remedy specific failures of the 
market.  
The Hungarian welfare 
system is equitable but 
not sustainable 
The Hungarian welfare system shows good 
performance from the perspective of reducing 
poverty, but it operates with low efficiency and 
cannot be sustained over the long term. The key 
reason is that benefits reduce willingness to work, 
resulting in high amounts of allowances being 
financed by a decreasing number of workers 
(taxpayers). 
62 per cent of 
expenditure goes on 
welfare  
Welfare expenditure accounts for 62 per cent of total 
public finances, and about one third of this is spent 
on social services. Leaving aside pensions, the 
largest expenditure item, one quarter of social 
spending involves price subsidies; the next largest 
is tax allowances, accounting for about 18 per cent; 
while only 5 per cent of social spending is allocated 
to means-tested benefits targeted at helping the 
poor. 
Redistribution in its 
entirety operates at low 
efficiency  
While it does significantly reduce income disparity, 
on the whole the benefit and tax system operates at 
low efficiency. A major indication of this is that 
some allowances are also awarded to the better-off, 
while for them, in relative terms, benefits do not 
mean a significant increase in income. The richer 
half of households receive a disproportionately 
large share of the total amount of support, and the 
poorest decile of households receive no more than 
the second poorest. 
Targeting of social 
benefits is at average 
A key objective of social policy is to reduce child 
poverty, and its main tool is family support. This 
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level, while targeting of 
price subsidies is poor 
support is relatively well targeted, despite the fact 
that eligibility is not linked to income. At the same 
time, 23 per cent of the total amount spent on family 
support is received by richer households. The other 
key priority is to improve the condition of the poor. 
Although means-tested benefits (regular social 
assistance and housing benefit) are relatively well 
channelled to the poor, unjustified claims (i.e. 
overpaid amounts) are quite high. From among the 
various forms of support, tax allowances, the gas 
subsidy and preferential VAT give too much to the 
wealthier deciles. 
Recommendations Better targeting of benefits and tax allowances 
could reduce expenditure. Abolishing price 
subsidies, preferential VAT and tax allowances, as 
well as increasing well targeted cash and in-kind 
support, would improve efficiency.  
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1. Introduction  
Redistribution has an impact on both the expenditure and the revenue 
side of general government. Through the collection of taxes and contributions, 
the state takes income away from individuals and other actors in the economy. 
If this were not done evenly across the board, some would have relatively more, 
and others relatively less disposable income than is justified by their economic 
performance. However, a significant part of government revenue is channelled 
straight back to the population in the form of welfare allowances and services. 
The share of benefits received by individuals is typically different from what 
would be justified by their tax payments: this is the redistribution impact on the 
expenditure side. 
Redistribution basically serves three objectives: it creates funding for the 
production of public goods, it offsets failures of market distribution in order to 
maximize the volume of distributable goods, and it improves the equity of 
distribution. According to classical welfare economics, the state must intervene 
in areas where market failures occur.1 Therefore, in addition to its political 
function and its role in maintaining public order, the state may perform duties 
that improve social welfare but that (for one reason or another) would not 
function, or would function only poorly, on a market basis.2 Such state duties 
include education, the organization and funding of health insurance and health 
services, or the pollution tax, as these can improve current welfare standards or 
can expand sources for future welfare needs. In addition to providing public 
goods and offsetting market failures, a further task is to make income 
distribution fairer and more equitable.  
 
Selection of the objectives and means of redistribution  
Redistribution is efficient3 if it is performed with the smallest possible 
distortion and with the lowest social expenditure. This can be achieved if its 
specific objectives are accomplished using the most suitable means. Allowances 
targeted at specific groups (e.g. the poor) are better provided through means 
that allow the government to determine the scope of the beneficiaries. For 
                                                 
1 A market failure occurs if a basic condition required for the effective operation of the market 
is not fulfilled. These conditions are: market players (i) are fully informed, (ii) have nearly 
identical economic weights and regard prices as an external condition, and finally (iii) there 
are no external economic impacts (externalities), public goods or increasing returns to scale 
(Csaba and Tóth, 1999). 
2 It is questionable whether the state is indeed able to remedy the failure of markets, or whether 
such a function would cost more than the loss the state hopes to avoid (Pete, 2001). 
3 A solution is deemed efficient when it achieves the same result while consuming fewer 
resources. 
 6
instance, a price subsidy on children’s shoes cannot be tied to customers’ 
income, while free meals for children may be provided to poorer families only. 
If the government intends to encourage the consumption of particular goods 
(e.g. environment-friendly products, or education), the best means are those 
where the government has the opportunity to determine the scope of goods. 
The table below summarizes the basic scenarios. 
 
 Table 1 Main means of redistribution according to economic impact  
 Who is the final 
beneficiary of the 
support? 
 What product/service is 
purchased with the 
benefit? 
 Decision of 
the 
government  
Decision 
of the 
individual 
 Decision of 
the 
government 
Decision of 
the 
individual 
Cash benefit and 
income tax x    x 
Price subsidy and 
preferential VAT  x  x  
In-kind benefit x   x  
 
Cash benefits are the most efficient means of equitable redistribution, 
because it is the beneficiary who decides how to use the money, and this tool 
best ensures the maximization of individual preferences. But because there is 
usually a need for separate administration of delivery, this tool may be costly. 
Income taxes, too, are better at reaching target groups than price subsidies, but they 
affect only those who have taxable income to begin with. Price subsidies limit the 
decision-making freedom of the individual and distort the operation of the 
market, as they benefit the manufacturers of specific products. This, therefore, is 
not an efficient tool to make redistribution more equitable, but it may be 
suitable to offset externalities. The preferential VAT rate differs from price 
subsidies only in that its administration is cheaper. Finally, in-kind support, 
which also limits the decision-making freedom of the individual, is efficient 
only if the goal is specifically to boost the consumption of a product or service 
(e.g. education or children’s meals) and if such support is difficult to exchange 
for money or to reject. 
Among the elements on the expenditure side, in-kind and cash benefits 
may be awarded universally or on the basis of need. Allowances granted on the 
basis of need are well targeted and relatively cheaper. However, the associated 
costs are increased by a complicated needs assessment, which entails 
administrative costs and provides opportunities for abuse. Another problem is 
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that the support may not reach all those in need. Finally, income-based support 
can also have a negative impact on willingness to work (it can create a poverty 
trap). 
 
The degree of redistribution in Hungary  
An indicator of government redistribution frequently used is income 
centralization, i.e. the ratio of tax revenue compared to GDP. Examining that 
indicator, the size of government in Hungary is relatively small compared to 
the average of the EU-15, but it is large in comparison with the Baltic states. 
When examining EU member states, we see a positive correlation between per 
capita income and tax revenue: the wealthier a country, the higher its tax 
receipts (Figure 1). In Sweden and Denmark, where large welfare systems are 
operated, the state budget is relatively large, while the state budget in Ireland is 
very small compared to the country’s level of development. As regards 
Hungary, tax receipts are more or less in line with the country’s level of 
development.4 
Figure 1 The ratio between tax revenues and aggregate income in the EU-15 member 
states and in six new members, 2004 
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Note: GDP/per capita (in 2004, PPS based) and total tax revenue as a percentage 
of GDP in 2004. Based on the database of EU AMECO. 
Source: Benedek et al. (2004). 
                                                 
4 For more on the trends of tax revenues and their international comparison, see Benedek et al. 
(2004) and Benedek et al. (2006).  
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Redistribution improving equity 
In this paper we examine redistribution aiming at improving equity, and 
disregard the factors (adjustment of externalities, incentives) that influence the 
degree of welfare. Therefore, we shall look at the expenditure and revenue that 
are aimed at providing a fairer and more equitable income distribution across 
society (e.g. family benefit), and at the expenditure and revenue that have a 
significant impact on income reallocation (e.g. tax allowances).  
Equity and fairness in themselves only imply some sort of consistent 
commitment to proportionate burdens and access to public goods. The selection 
of benchmarks regarding the ratios is a question of ideology. The various 
interpretations are usually consistent, in that by ‘fairness’ they mean equality; 
but they differ in whether that means equality before the law or equality 
according to merit or need.5 Another important difference arises from the 
nature and extent of the role assigned to the state in the creation of equitable 
distribution.  
At one end of the scale are Marxist and socialist theories, which set needs-
based equality as a target, and are of the view that the state must assume a 
major role in creating fairness. At the other end is the libertarian approach, 
according to which the state need not intervene in market processes, as it is the 
market that creates fair (merit-based) distribution, compared to which 
government intervention can only be less efficient and therefore weakens 
standards of welfare. Between the two extremes are the democratic socialist 
approach, whose key goal is to establish equality, though it also assigns an 
important role to the market, and the liberal theory, which regards efficiency as 
the most important feature, but accepts government intervention if that is the 
best solution from the point of view of overall social welfare.  
Hungary’s government programme regards support for families with 
children and for the elderly as a key priority, and has declared the 
government’s intention of increasing the role played by needs-based benefits 
(New Hungary, 2006). Based on the above, the current government’s 
interpretation of fairness is closest to the democratic socialist theory.  
This principle of needs-based benefits supplies the focus for our paper, 
i.e. we are going to examine to what extent the overall redistribution system 
and its individual elements are able to ensure that poorer people receive more 
support, and richer people less. 
In a number of respects, the study is limited due to a lack of available 
data. Some types of benefit are not supported by any data (e.g. pensioner travel 
                                                 
5 A good summary of fairness theory is given by e.g. Pierson and Castles (2000) or Barr (1998). 
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allowance or tax-exempt incomes), while in the case of others, data at the 
individual level do not exist or are not available (e.g. subsidies on medicines).  
First, the study will review the state budget structures of welfare models, 
along with the types and volume of major revenue and expenditure items. As a 
next step, we shall present the redistribution impacts that the elements of the 
tax and benefit system have on household income: on the revenue side we shall 
take a closer look at direct and indirect taxes, and on the expenditure side we 
will examine universal and means-tested cash benefits, tax allowances and the 
gas price subsidy. Finally, based on the results of the analyses presented in the 
study, we shall formulate recommendations regarding modification of the 
structure of welfare expenditure.  
 
2. Welfare models in Europe  
The EU member states may be divided into four categories by the size 
and structure of their welfare systems: (1) liberal, (2) Scandinavian, (3) 
conservative, or (4) southern European models (Esping-Andersen, 1990; Sapir, 
2005). Aside from the size of the state budget, there are differences between the 
various models in terms of their selection of tools – i.e. the relative significance 
of income-based/universal, cash/in-kind benefits, and of various tax types and 
contributions. 
In the United Kingdom, which belongs in the liberal category, there is a 
strong emphasis on the responsibility of the individual and on market 
mechanisms. As a result, welfare spending is low, as are receipts from tax and 
contributions, and welfare service providers are often market players. In the 
social benefit system, means-tested and targeted benefits play a major role. The 
range of beneficiaries is narrow, but the standard of the benefits is relatively 
high. 
Scandinavian countries generally seek to increase employment levels and 
to reduce income inequalities. Universal benefits are typical, and the number 
and significance of income-based transfers are relatively small. The bulk of 
services come from the public sector, and this results in a high ratio of in-kind 
(non-cash) benefits.  
The main feature of conservative welfare systems is a broad social 
security system. The rate of social security contributions is fairly high for both 
employees and employers, and so is the associated government revenue. 
Welfare benefits are mainly provided in cash, rather than in kind. With widely 
available welfare benefits, income-based support is of average significance.  
The typical feature of southern European countries is that they have 
undeveloped welfare states, and eligibility – although determined centrally – is 
often difficult to enforce at the local level. The major part of benefits is tied to 
income, further regulated by many additional criteria (e.g. in Spain, no two 
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adults from the same family may receive social aid). Relatively few people 
receive benefits, and benefit amounts, too, are low. Consequently, state 
spending both on welfare and on social services is low. 
Sapir (2005) examines European welfare systems according to two 
criteria: social fairness and sustainability. He uses risk of poverty as an 
indicator of social fairness or equity. He measures sustainability through the 
level of employment: if appropriate incentives for work exist in a welfare 
system, and if the employment level is high, then sufficient revenue is 
generated to sustain the system. These are the two criteria in Figure 2 that serve 
as the basis for the classification of European countries, where risk of poverty is 
measured by the ratio of those living in permanent poverty,6 and employment 
is measured by the employment rate of 15–64-year-old population.  
From the perspective of reducing poverty, the Scandinavian and the 
conservative models perform well, but only the Scandinavian model has 
proved to be sustainable in the long term, i.e. efficient. The conservative 
model’s low level of efficiency is mainly due to the fact that benefits reduce 
willingness to work, resulting in high amounts of allowances being financed by a 
decreasing number of workers (taxpayers). The figure below reveals that 
Hungary belongs to the conservative group, where welfare systems cannot be 
sustained over the long term. 
Figure 2 Models of welfare systems in the European Union  
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Source: own calculation based on Sapir’s (2005) idea and on Eurostat data. 
 
The question arises, then: if the conservative model is not sustainable, 
what model should Hungary move towards, and what direction should the 
                                                 
6 In addition to those used here, other inequality indicators, such as the Gini indicator, lead to 
similar results.  
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country take? Figure 3 presents the relative positions of two efficient countries – 
Sweden and the United Kingdom – and Hungary, according to four variables 
that describe the extent and the structure of redistribution.  
 
Figure 3 The structure of tax revenues, welfare and social spending in Sweden, the 
United Kingdom and Hungary, 2003   
(tax+ssc)/GDP
Welfare exp./GDP
Rate of means-tested benefits
Rate of in-kind benefits
Sweden UK Hungary
 
Note: the indicator is 1 for the country with the largest value, and the other 
countries are positioned on the axis in proportion to that.  
Source: own calculation based on Eurostat data. 
 
In order to achieve the Scandinavian model with the current level of tax 
and GDP, the proportion of in-kind benefits within welfare spending should be 
increased. To move closer to the liberal model, Hungary should increase the 
proportion of income-based and in-kind benefits, while maintaining the 
existing level of welfare spending. However, the latter model may lead to an 
increase in income inequality, which may run counter to the preferences of the 
Hungarian electorate.  
 
3. The macro structure of welfare expenditure and the state budget  
In this paper we shall examine the revenue and expenditure of the state 
budget from the perspective of equity. Accordingly, on the expenditure side we 
are going to take a closer look at welfare spending, focusing on welfare 
expenditure that serves a social purpose; and on the revenue side we shall look 
at receipts from tax and contributions. First, we are going to review how much 
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of the central budget is spent on income redistribution for social purposes, and 
what the main delivery tools are.  
 
State budget expenditure 
In Hungary, state budget expenditure accounted for almost 52 per cent of 
GDP in 2004. Expenditure serves (1) state operational, (2) welfare, (3) economic 
and (4) public debt management functions. The real value of expenditure across 
these four categories showed significant swings in the period 1991–2004 (Figure 
4). Spending on the welfare function7 increased in real terms after 1997. This 
was primarily due to the stabilization package introduced in 1995, which 
resulted in a drop in the interest payment associated with government debt, 
which in turn created the opportunity to increase welfare spending. From 1997, 
education, social security and social expenditure grew significantly. The 
increase in welfare spending was especially significant in 2002, and was mainly 
attributable to an increase in the salaries of state-sector employees, and to the 
withdrawal of certain limits introduced earlier (e.g. those relating to family 
support). 
 
Figure 4 Major expenditure items at unadjusted 2004 prices, 1991–2004 (HUF 
billion) 
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7 The welfare function includes education and health care, and the social security, social and 
welfare services.  
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Source: Benedek et al. (2006). 
 
In 2004, welfare expenditure accounted for 62.2 per cent of the total state 
budget (Table 2). Over and above that amount are certain company subsidies 
that serve welfare purposes too, but are recognized in the statistics as economic 
functions. The actual degree of redistribution is also increased by welfare tax 
allowances granted to private individuals, which are omitted totally from the 
accounts of the state budget. When these are added, more than one third of 
welfare expenditure is spent on social purposes, such as the poverty alleviation. 
 
Table 2 The proportion of state expenditure on welfare in 2004 
 HUF 
billion 
As a share of 
the total state 
budget, % 
As a share of 
expenditure, 
including tax 
allowances, % 
As a 
share of 
GDP, % 
Welfare function *  5 924.3 62.2 58.0 29.1 
Company welfare 
benefits  182.2 1.91 1.84 0.9 
Tax allowances 398.1 4.18 4.01 2.0 
Welfare spending 
total  6 504.6 68.29 65.55 32.0 
Of which: on social 
purposes ** 2 245.2 23.57 22.63 11.0 
pension 1 678.9 17.63 16.44 8.2 
education*** 1 182.5 12.42 11.92 5.8 
health care*** 1 112.2 11.68 11.21 5.5 
* according to the GFS classification  
** without pension  
*** ESA95 data 
Note: the table includes both cash and in-kind benefits.  
Source: Ministry of Finance. 
 
We consider benefits to be fulfilling a social function if they increase the 
income or consumption of poorer or disadvantaged social groups. Such benefits 
include the regular social assistance or free public health care. Family benefits, 
 14
too, including the family tax allowance, fall into this category, based on the 
consideration that studies on poverty conducted in Hungary have revealed that 
having children significantly increases the risk of poverty, and therefore 
children, too, form a target group for social policy. This category does not 
include public services that are universally available, such as health care 
services or education. While these do, in fact, constitute welfare expenditure, 
they are not exclusively targeted at supporting disadvantaged groups.  
Although items enjoying preferential tax treatment and the exceptions in 
the tax system are not recognized as welfare expenditure, they do fulfil a 
welfare role and have an impact on redistribution, and therefore we look at the 
size of these items, too (for a list of exceptions and allowances related to the tax 
system, see Appendix F2). 
Although, in theory, old-age and disability pensions operate on an 
insurance basis, they do have significant redistribution implications, because 
the state budget uses tax revenue to offset the deficit in the pension fund. 
Pensions account for almost the same amount annually as cash and in-kind social 
benefits combined (see Appendix F3), and 15–20 per cent of pension 
expenditure is financed from the central budget. According to Orbán and 
Palotai (2005), the pension system’s long-term net implicit liability (the present 
value of the balance of contribution payments and pension disbursements) 
amounts to 240 per cent of GDP, which is almost four times the value recorded 
after the pension reform of 1997–98. This significant deterioration is due to the 
13th-month pension, introduced since the reform, and to a series of cuts in 
pension contributions.  
The Hungarian welfare system provides social benefits in three ways: 
cash benefits, benefits in kind and price subsidies. The bulk of social 
expenditure occurs through cash benefits tailored to a particular objective, 
though these include a very low proportion of benefits based on need and 
income (Figure 5). Also, the proportion of price subsidies – a tool much less 
suited to achieving social objectives – is significant and, as we shall see, this is 
the area in which efficiency could be most enhanced.  
 
Figure 5 Social expenditures and their ratio compared to GDP, 2004 
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Note: the relevant Forint data are included in Appendix F3. 
 
Among social benefits, the largest amount is spent on medicine price 
subsidies: in 2004 this accounted for more than HUF 330 billion. This is 
followed by employee tax allowance (HUF 238 billion in 2004) and family 
support (HUF 186 billion). Benefits with an annual amount in excess of HUF 25 
billion account for almost 68 per cent of all social benefits (Table 3).  
 
Table 3 Social benefits with an amount in excess of HUF 25 billion, in 2004  
  
Amount 
(HUF billion) 
As a 
percentage 
of social 
benefits  
As a 
percentage 
of GDP  
Number of 
beneficiaries 
(thousand 
people) 
Benefits to the ill and the handicapped    
Medicine price subsidy 332.0 14.8  1.6  - 
Support for the employment of 
people with disabilities 64.1 2.9  0.3  - 
Allowances to people with 
disabilities 64.4 2.9  0.3  232 
Benefits to families with children    
Family support* 185.5 8.3  0.9  2 100 
Family tax allowance* 80.7 3.6  0.4  987 
Child care allowance (GYED) 54.5 2.4  0.3  84 
Child care grant (GYES) 48.7 2.2  0.2  163 
Regular child protection benefit* 43.4 1.9  0.2  675 
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Home purchase benefits      
Interest relief on mortgage bonds 90.8 4.7  0.5  
Supplementary interest relief 36.3 2.0  0.2  
House construction allowance 
(social policy allowance) 33.3 1.7  0.2  
63.4 
Travel benefits     
Support for the operation of  state 
railway passenger transport  52.0 2.3  0.3  - 
Long-distance coach service 45.0 2.0  0.2  - 
Subsidy towards local public 
transport 34.0 1.5  0.2  - 
Railway subsidy 25.0 1.1  0.1  - 
Other social benefits     
Employee tax allowance and 
supplementary tax allowance 238.7 10.6  1.2  2 900 
Gas price subsidy 43.8 2.0  0.2  - 
Regular social assistance 27.0 1.2  0.1  147 
Amount 1 499.2 68.1  7.4  - 
Total benefits (including those 
with amounts less than HUF 25 
billion) 
2 245.2 100.0  11.0  - 
* Due to the changes introduced in the family benefit system after 2004 (when 
both the regular child protection benefit and, in part, the family tax allowance 
were merged into the family support), the budget plan in 2006 for family 
support is HUF 318 billion, for family tax allowance HUF 13 billion, and for the 
regular child protection benefit HUF 0.  
Source: Ministry of Finance. 
 
Tax-related allowances 
In this section we review income categories subject to preferential tax 
treatment (see also Appendix F2). Some tax allowances do not (or do so only 
partially), serve social functions, but their presence in the system has a 
significant impact on redistribution. Preferential treatment takes four forms:  
1. the tax allowance applies to the taxpayer, on the basis of specific criteria;  
2. the particular source of income is tax exempt, but if the individual has other 
income too, it must be declared on the tax return and it will increase the 
average tax. This category is referred to as ‘tax-exempt benefit’;  
3. the particular income is not taxed according to the standard tax table, but 
special considerations or tax rates are applied;  
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4. the particular income is tax exempt, and does not have to be declared on the 
tax return.  
Preferential treatment may be granted in light of the following considerations:  
⇒ no income should be double taxed by the state: a number of welfare benefits are 
based on contributions paid earlier, which were paid from taxed income. To 
tax such income again, therefore, would mean double taxation. In this 
respect, Hungarian statutes are not consistent, because pensions and 
unemployment benefits are tax exempt, while child care allowance, sick pay 
and the pregnancy and confinement benefit are taxable and enjoy no tax 
allowances whatsoever. 
⇒ reduction of the administrative burden: tax exemption of social benefits is 
justified by a reduction in administration: significant administrative costs 
would be incurred by the state budget if benefits were first disbursed and 
then partly clawed back in the form of tax. However, the legislation is again 
contradictory, because the child care grant and the GYET (child care benefit) 
are included in the tax return as tax-exempt benefits, but other social 
benefits are not.  
⇒ encouraging particular behaviour (e.g. saving up or entering employment), and 
improving the income situation of certain social groups. Behind some of the 
allowances in this category lie not social policy or economic considerations, 
but rather lobby interests or political goals. Examples include employee tax 
allowance, or allowances for the repayment of subsidized housing loans.  
 
Reliable information regarding the use and the volume of tax allowances 
is available for the first three preferential categories, but in some cases 
information is limited. For instance, only those who have other taxable income 
are required to declare tax-exempt benefits on their tax returns. With  
preferentially taxed income, too, it may be that, if an individual’s earnings do 
not exceed a low limit, the income does not have to be declared (e.g. in the case 
of income from primary farming production). However, the tax authority has 
no information whatsoever about non-taxable income.  
The state budget forgoes at least HUF 450 billion of revenue8 per year 
through tax allowances. According to our estimates, the annual amount of tax-
exempt benefits is at least HUF 86 billion. Those that have only such income do 
not need to file a tax return or pay tax, and therefore we also use other data 
sources in estimating this item (see Table 4). 
 
                                                 
8 Excluding the revenue shortfall due to the reduced tax on income subject to preferential tax 
rates. We do not try to estimate that item in this paper. 
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Table 4 Tax on tax-exempt benefits and the number of beneficiaries  
 2006 (forecast) 
2005 
(forecast) 
2004 
(actual) 
2003 
(actual) 
2002 
(actual) 
Tax-exempt benefits declared 
on tax returns (HUF million) n.a. n.a. 69 705 67 021 58 580 
Tax on tax-exempt benefits as 
per the tax table (HUF million) 18 993 18 621 17 974 18 942 16 628 
Number of beneficiaries  n.a. n.a. 186 336 186 167 182 654 
Tax exempt benefits total* 
(GYES+GYET+stipendium) 
(HUF billion) 
n.a. n.a. 86  
Note: The list of tax-exempt benefits is attached in Appendix F2. The most 
significant are GYES, GYET, foster parent benefit, nursing benefit and benefits 
payable to full-time students (e.g. stipendium, benefit for textbook purchase 
and housing).  
*Minimum estimate, but includes income not declared on tax returns. 
Source: Tax Authority and Ministry of Finance.  
 
Tax revenues  
Taxes and contributions are the most significant revenues in the state 
budget, both in terms of volume and their impact on the economy. Different tax 
types may have different redistribution impacts. In the case of direct taxes, the 
principle of equal treatment is easier to enforce, and through allowances the 
government is able to provide targeted support to specific groups. In the case of 
indirect taxes, it is up to the consumer to decide what products he wishes to 
buy, and therefore allowances provided through such taxes are less suited to 
supporting specific target groups in society. 
In Hungary, the weight of indirect taxes is relatively high, accounting for 
nearly 40 per cent of tax receipts. That is regarded as high compared to EU 
member states, while the proportion of direct taxes is relatively low (Figure 6). 
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Figure 6 Tax receipts according to tax type as a percentage of total tax receipts  
in the EU-15 member states and in seven new members, 2004 
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Source: Benedek et al. (2006). 
 
Tax regimes across the EU member states are very different. However, it 
is clear that in Hungary the proportion of tax revenue from capital income is 
low compared to almost all other countries, while receipts from tax on labour is 
average. It is important to emphasize, though, that aggregate data do not 
provide information about the tax burden at the level of the individual, because 
there can be significant variations between countries in terms of the proportion 
of active population. With the same aggregate tax burden, the per capita tax 
payment is lower if the number of active workers, and therefore the number of 
taxpayers, is higher. 
Figure 7 Tax revenues from labour, capital and consumption as a percentage of total 
tax revenue, 2002 
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Source: Benedek et al. (2004). 
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4. The targeting of redistribution  
As we indicated in the introduction, in this paper we are looking at those 
redistribution elements of the state budget whose purpose is to achieve a higher 
level of social equity. The government programme identifies poorer people and 
families with children as target groups for its social policy, i.e. the government 
wishes to improve equity by supporting those groups. When evaluating social 
expenditure, we focus on its contribution to achievement of these two goals. To 
this end, we shall review the extent to which the various benefits, tax 
allowances and taxes reallocate earnings from richer income groups to poorer 
or disadvantaged people, and the efficiency of that reallocation. We define 
efficiency as achievement of the desired level of redistribution at the lowest 
possible cost. One way of ensuring this is to use well-targeted benefits, while 
another is to keep the administrative costs of benefits to a minimum.  
We consider a benefit to be well targeted if a significant part of it reaches 
the target group, in this case the poor or families with children. Two types of 
problems may emerge in connection with targeting benefits: underpayment and 
overpayment. Underpayment occurs when the benefit does not reach all who 
are in need, while overpayment means that those not in need also have access 
to a benefit. It is up to the judgement of decision makers which one is 
considered more important. There is typically less overpayment with means-
tested benefits, while universal benefits are less likely to fail to reach eligible 
individuals.  
Micro-level data are required to examine the targeting of benefits. In 
evaluating the redistribution impact of the individual items of the state budget 
we rely on analysis available in the literature (microdata-based analysis), on our 
own calculations prepared on the basis of the Household Budget Survey of the 
Central Statistics Office (CSO), and on the results of tests carried out using the 
microsimulation model9 of the Ministry of Finance.  
In contrast to calculations prepared for ‘typical’ groups (e.g. those 
earning a minimum wage, or two-child families), the microsimulation model 
also facilitates an impact assessment that covers every significant demographic 
group. And, compared to income studies based on population surveys, the 
model takes a somewhat wider view of the benefit system, because it includes 
                                                 
9 The TÁRSZIM 2005 model is a product of TÁRKI and the software was developed by 
VirgoSystems Ltd. The production of the model was funded by the Ministry of Finance and 
the Ministry of Youth, Family, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities. The databases of the 
tax authority APEH, the CSO and TÁRKI were used during production of the model. 
 21
some tax allowances and in-kind benefits that are typically not taken into 
consideration in the population surveys.10  
It is important to note that, from among the elements of the social and 
family support system, we primarily examine cash benefits, in particular those 
not based on insurance, i.e. universal and means-tested benefits, and in some 
cases – where indicated – social tax allowances. Due to the absence of data, we 
do not examine the targeting of in-kind benefits, and, of the various price 
subsidies, we consider only the redistribution impacts of the gas price 
subsidy.11 
 
The overall redistributive impact of the tax and benefits system in 2006 
In spite of its paramount importance in evaluating social policy, so far as 
we are aware there has been no comprehensive study done in Hungary on the 
overall redistributive effect of the tax and benefits system.  
According to our calculations, prepared using microsimulation, 
significant income reallocation is to be found among households if tax liabilities 
and benefits received are also taken into consideration. The poorer half of 
households pay less tax as a percentage of their disposable income than they 
receive in the form of government benefits (Figure 8). If, however, we also 
recognize social security contributions, then those on an average income 
become net contributors to the system. It is also worth noting that, although the 
richer one third of the population receive a significant slice of the total amount 
of benefits (see Figure 9), these benefits account for only 2–5 per cent of their 
income. 
                                                 
10 Because in Hungary there is no database available including income, tax, consumption and 
household data, the model’s data set was merged from three databases: the data from the 
TÁRKI Monitor for 2003, the 2003 data of the CSO Household Budget Survey, and the tax 
authority’s (APEH) personal income tax return data for 2003. In the case of analyses not 
related to 2003, we used multipliers to modify the base parameters. For more details on the 
data, see TÁRKI (2005). 
11 For further details on microsimulation method, see Benedek and Lelkes (2005). 
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Figure 8 Tax payment (personal income tax), social security contributions and benefits  
as a percentage of disposable income, households, 200612 
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Source: TÁRSZIM 2005. 
 
In Figure 9 we compare the actual distribution of benefits to a 
hypothetical distribution that follows a straight-line decrease. This flat 
distribution gives the most to the poorest decile, and, although there is a 
gradual decrease, it gives some benefits to every income group in order to 
ensure continuity. The figure clearly illustrates that the richer half of the 
population receives an unfairly large share of the total amount of the benefits 
(plus the family tax allowance): each of the upper five deciles receives about 8–
10 per cent. It is also striking that the first and second deciles receive more or 
less the same percentage of the benefits.  
                                                 
12 In certain cases, we calculate the per capita income within households on an equivalent basis. 
This means that we divide the household income not by the number of household members, 
but by a smaller number. The reason is that economy of scale is a factor in the consumption of 
household goods, i.e. households with more people do not need a proportionately higher 
income to maintain the given standard of living. On the whole, therefore, we must take into 
consideration that a household with more members will not have proportionately larger 
expenses, and thus incomes do not need to be proportionately larger either. 
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Figure 9 The distribution of the total amount of benefits plus the family tax allowance 
across income deciles, 2006 
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A key target group in the government’s redistribution policy is families 
with children. This group is reached adequately, because families with children 
receive more benefits in relation to their income than do families without 
children; in particular, the per capita benefit grows as the number of children 
increases; and also the proportion of benefits in the family income rises in line 
with the number of children (Figure 10).  
Figure 10 Per capita income and the proportion of benefits in income according to the 
number of children, 2006   
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Source: TÁRSZIM 2005. 
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Targeting of elements in the benefit system  
The elements of the benefit system may be grouped into three categories: 
universal benefits, means-tested benefits and tax allowances. Universal benefits, 
and in particular family support, have the greatest proportion. The second most 
important group is social tax allowances, which includes employee tax 
allowance and family tax allowance. The importance of means-tested benefits 
that specifically target the poor is quite low compared to the other two benefit 
groups.  
 
Universal benefits 
The most significant element in the family benefit system is the universal 
family support. In 2004, family support amounted to a total of HUF 185 billion, 
but, due to changes subsequently introduced in the benefit system, in 2006 the 
amount is expected to reach HUF 316 billion. According to earlier analyses, 
family support is relatively well targeted, despite the fact that eligibility is not 
based on income. The reason is that, in Hungary, families with children 
typically belong to poorer households. According to Havasi (2005), it is 
especially families with many children that are at high risk of poverty, which is 
significantly mitigated by the family benefit system. According to Tóth (2005), 
the efficiency of targeting family support improved steadily from the early 
1990s to 1997, after which it remained at more or less the same level. According 
to his calculations, in 2003 about 35 per cent of all family support was 
distributed to the poorest income quintile, as against 29 per cent in 1995. Based 
on Mózer’s (2002) calculations performed on CSO Household Budget Survey 
data, the bottom income quintile receives 33 per cent of family support; at the 
same time, though, the upper income quintile’s share of family support 
increased from 13 per cent in 1998 to 20 per cent in 2002.  
The results of the calculation prepared on the basis of microsimulation 
are in accord with previous analyses: the amount of family support is highest in 
the three bottom deciles (Figure 11). However, it can also be seen that, although 
family support provides much more to poorer families, the amounts received 
by richer families is also substantial.  
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Figure 11 Average use of family support per household, by income decile, 2006  
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Source: TÁRSZIM 2005. 
 
The relevance of family support within disposable income changes not 
only with the household’s income situation, but also with the number of 
children. As most families with three or more children are in the lower half of 
the income distribution, family support can be relatively well targeted by 
differentiating according to the number of children (Figure 12). 
Figure 12 The ratio of family support within income, according to the income situation 
and the number of children, 2006 
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Source: TÁRSZIM 2005. 
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Maternity benefits: GYES and GYET. 
According to Tóth (2005), in 2003 about 35–40 per cent of the total 
amount of maternity benefits and family support, and almost half of all 
benefits, was received by the lowest income quintile. ‘Therefore claims that 
welfare benefits are not appropriately targeted are no longer valid’ (Tóth, 2005: 
p. 3). At the same time, there is an increase in the benefits received by the top 
decile. According to Mózer (2002), the distribution of maternity benefits has 
widened: the share of the lowest income quintile has grown by 2 per cent, while 
that of the top income quintile has increased by 5 percentage points, from 9 to 
14 per cent.  
Data from the CSO Household Budget Survey for 2003 reveal that, 
although the child care grant13 (GYES, provided up to the age of 3) and the child 
care benefit (GYET, provided after the age of 3, to full-time mothers) are not 
means-tested benefits, a significant share of both is received by the poorest 20 
per cent, and the share going to the top two deciles is almost negligible. The 
primary reason is that the upper deciles are typically eligible for the insurance-
based GYED, which, in their case, replaces GYES. GYES and GYET are identical 
in amount (they equal the minimum pension), and thus the difference seen in 
Figure 13 is purely due to the fact that there are about three and a half times as 
many people receiving GYES as GYET.  
Figure 13 Average household income from GYES and GYET, according to income 
deciles, 2003 
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Source: own calculation based on data from the CSO Household Budget Survey.  
                                                 
13 The maternity benefit, GYES and GYET are social benefits provided to all citizens. 
Additionally, there are insurance-based maternity benefits, GYED and TGYÁS, which we do 
not discuss in this paper.  
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Tax allowances 
Of the tax allowances, employee tax allowance and family tax allowance 
serve social functions. Employee tax allowance reduces the actual amount of tax 
payments, and the resulting shortfall in revenue came to about HUF 238 billion 
in 2004. Based on data from APEH’s tax returns, Tóth (1997) showed that as 
income grows the amount of tax allowance claimed increases. In 1994, 58 per 
cent of tax allowances were claimed by the top 20 per cent of taxpayers, and the 
figure was similar in 1996. Contrary to expectations, the greatest use of tax 
allowances, as a share of income, was made not by the richest, but by the third 
decile (Tóth, 1997). 
We arrive at a similar result on the basis of the microsimulation analysis. 
The amount of tax allowances increase in line with income in the poorest three 
deciles, and shows a significant decrease only in the top quintile (Figure 14). 
The reason for this is that the poorer groups do not have taxable income and, 
although a higher level of taxable income gives greater scope for writing off tax, 
the maximum amount available for tax allowance decreases above a certain 
income level.  
The lower take-up of allowances in the middle of the income distribution is 
due to a higher rate of pensioner households with no work income (see the section 
on Pensions below), not eligible for this form of benefit.  
Figure 14 Average amount of employee tax allowance (together with supplementary 
tax allowance) and of family tax allowance per household, by income decile, 
2006 
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Source: TÁRSZIM 2005. 
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Regulation of family tax allowance has been fairly eventful over the past 
two decades. It was terminated by the Bokros austerity package, only to be 
reintroduced by the new government in 1998, with a monthly amount equal to 
50–60 per cent of family support (Ferge and Juhász, 2004). In 2004, the total 
revenue shortfall due to the family tax allowance was about HUF 80 billion, but 
the plan for 2006 is only HUF 13 billion, as families with one or two children are 
no longer eligible.  
Earlier analyses do not make clear who receives family tax allowance. 
According to some estimates, 17 per cent of families do not have access to it at 
all, and a further 10–20 per cent only make partial use of it. However, Ferge 
(2001), for instance, debates those figures on the basis of aggregate data, and 
comes up with a much lower estimate of take-up.  
On the basis of data from APEH for 2002, Darvas and Mózer (2004) 
found that 86 per cent of tax-paying families used the allowance in full, and 14 
per cent used it in part. However, 17 per cent of all families with children do not 
have taxable income, and therefore they do not receive any of this benefit. This is a 
problem, because use of the allowance shows a positive correlation with the 
income situation, i.e. the direction of redistribution is negative (inverse). In 
addition, Darvas and Mózer (2004) found that it is mainly families with one or 
two children that claim the tax allowance. 
A similar result is produced by the microsimulation analysis. Like 
employee tax allowance, family tax allowance also fails to reach the poorest 
decile, since people in this category do not have a sufficient level of tax liability 
that they can offset using the tax allowance (Figure 14). However, this benefit 
gives less to the richer half of the distribution, as people with three or more 
children – those currently entitled to this tax allowance – typically belong to the 
poorer households in terms of income per capita. 
 
Means-tested benefits 
The advantage of means-tested benefits linked to income is that – being 
available to a smaller circle of beneficiaries – in theory, they are cheaper and 
have a larger impact on redistribution and on income reallocation than 
universal benefits. The drawback is that – in addition to having higher 
administrative costs and a potential stigmatizing effect – they are imperfectly 
targeted: there are non-eligible recipients, while those that would, in fact, be 
eligible to receive such benefits are not always reached.  
Kőnig (2004) reports a decrease in the role of means-tested benefits, 
demonstrating that both the range of beneficiaries and the expenditure in real 
terms on such benefits decreased between 1998 and 2002. A key reason is the 
relative decline in the value of the income threshold of eligibility: wages and 
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pensions increase at a higher rate than the minimum pension, which serves as 
the threshold for most means-tested benefits. Due to the low eligibility limit, a 
large proportion of the poor have no access to the benefit: according to various 
calculations, the ratio of poor people receiving this benefit is as low as 20–40 per 
cent. In other words, means-tested benefits are not well targeted, as they fail to 
reach the majority of poor families. According to Mózer (2002), underpayment 
decreased between 1998 and 2001; the share of the benefits received by the 
bottom income quintile grew from 24 per cent to 50 per cent, and thus the 
benefit has become significantly better targeted.   
 
Regular social assistance 
Firle and Szabó (2006) examined the targeting of the regular social 
assistance granted to the unemployed,14 being the most significant means-tested 
benefit that exists today. According to data from the CSO Household Budget 
Survey for 2003, the benefit’s take-up rate (the ratio of beneficiaries to eligible 
people) is 55 per cent. Some 83 per cent of beneficiaries come from the poorer 
third of households (Figure 15), i.e. the benefit may be regarded as well 
targeted. Being well informed and having a strong link to the labour market are 
the factors that have the greatest bearing on the likelihood of someone taking 
up the benefit. Among people with higher educational attainment levels, the 
ratio of recipients is significantly lower than the ratio of eligible people, which 
is partly attributable to the stigmatizing effect of the benefit (Firle and Szabó, 
2006).   
 
                                                 
14 Although the conditions for the benefit are centrally regulated, eligibility is established and 
the benefit is disbursed by local governments. According to the law, active non-employed 
people are eligible to receive the regular social benefit if their personal income is below 70 per 
cent of the minimum pension, and if their household has a per capita income below 80 per cent 
of the minimum pension. In 2003, the monthly average amount of the benefit was HUF 15,000. 
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Figure 15 Distribution of recipients of the regular social assistance, 2003 
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Source: Firle and Szabó (2006) 
 
The eligibility threshold is at the upper limit of the second decile, and 
thus the figure also reveals that a significant proportion of the recipients 
(approx. 30 per cent) were not entitled to receive the benefit. In 98 per cent of 
cases, the reason for this is that income per capita in the household exceeds the 
statutory limit. This may be partly related to local government having a limited 
ability to accurately identify the income of other household members, as a 
result of which they establish eligibility based on a per capita income that is 
lower than the actual amount. Here we must note, however, that the definition 
of eligibility as used in the study is based on annual income, while local 
government awards the benefit on the basis of income earned during the three 
months preceding the application. As a result, the 30 per cent mentioned above 
may be a slight overestimate of the number of ineligible recipients. 
There are regional differences in the proportion of ineligible recipients: in 
the poorer regions of northern Hungary and in the northern Great Plain 
ineligible people are less likely to collect the benefit than in the central and 
western regions of Hungary. This implies that, in addition to the statutory 
limits, local governments also take into consideration the relative income 
situation of applicants when they award the benefit. 
 
Housing benefit 
A decreasing trend may be witnessed in the case of housing benefit, too: 
between 1998 and 2004, the number of recipients dropped by almost 80,000, 
from 268,000 to 176,000. This occurred at a time when there was a steady increase 
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in housekeeping expenses, and it happened despite the fact that maintaining 
housing conditions was a key priority of social policy (Kőnig, 2004). According 
to a study conducted by TÁRKI, 16.3 per cent of Hungarian households, or 
almost 625,000 households, may be regarded as in need of this support, yet only 
about 30 per cent of those families actually received the benefit. Another 
problem is that half of the benefits are not channelled to the poorest groups, but to 
households where ‘paying the bills is usually not a problem’ (Szivós, 2002). 
Also, the average benefit amount disbursed to the latter group (HUF 24,800 
annually) is significantly higher than the amount disbursed to those in need 
(HUF 19,960).  
The CSO Household Budget Survey data show a picture similar to the 
findings above. Although the number of recipients of housing benefit is highest 
in the bottom decile, the number of beneficiaries is strikingly high in the middle 
four deciles (Figure 16), which – in the case of a means-tested benefit – points to 
a flaw in the system. Taking the amount of the benefit into consideration, the 
share received by the middle third of the population is smaller, but even so 
Figure 17 shows considerable overpayment. 
 
Figure 16 Distribution of households receiving housing benefit, by income decile, 2003 
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Source: own calculations based on CSO HBS 
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Figure 17 The average amount of housing benefit, by decile (HUF/year), 2003 
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Source: own calculations based on CSO HBS 
 
It is not only the number of recipients of housing benefit that is very low 
– so is the per capita amount of the benefit: in 2002, the HUF 1,800 average 
amount of the benefit covered only 8 per cent of the HUF 22,000 it typically costs 
each month to keep a house. Leaving aside local government regulations, the 
low amount of the benefit is attributable to the fact that the lowest statutory 
amount of the benefit, HUF 1,000 per month, has not increased since 1993. In 
2003, nearly 70 per cent of disbursements were at or below HUF 3,000, while 
more than half of the recipients had bills of between HUF 15,000 and HUF 
25,000 a month (Kőnig, 2004). Given all this, the link between actual housing 
expenses and the amount of the benefit is rather tenuous, i.e. the benefit is not 
aligned with the actual expenditure. 
 
Regular child protection benefit 
Up to 2005, an income-based element in the family support system was 
the regular child protection benefit, which was scrapped on 1 January 2006. 
Earlier analyses of child poverty (Darvas and Tausz, 2001; Ferge, 2001) 
emphasize the deficiencies of income-dependent benefits in the family support 
system. In their opinion, even though to improve the targeting of the family 
support system was always an explicit policy objective over the past two 
decades, because another goal was to reduce expenditure ‘ultimately, the 
changes in the benefit system did not result in any significant increase in 
benefits provided to low-income families’ (Darvas and Tausz, 2001: p. 7).  
According to data from the CSO’s household statistics, three-quarters of 
the total amount paid out as regular child protection benefit was received by 
people in the lower income deciles and, in particular, the benefit was relatively 
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efficient in reaching families with children that were at higher risk of poverty 
(Darvas and Mózer, 2004): 40 per cent of recipients were single-parent families, 
and the ratio of households with more than one child was significant. In 2001, 
57 per cent of households with children in the lowest three deciles of the 
population received this benefit. At the same time, a significant proportion of 
households that ought to qualify for the benefit based on their per capita 
income did not receive the support.  
Based on our own calculations (Figure 18), both cash and in-kind child 
protection benefits are well targeted, and the amounts received by the richer 
half of the population are negligible. 
Figure 18 Average amount of cash and in-kind child protection benefits per household, 
by decile, 2003 
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Source: TÁRSZIM 2005 
 
Pensions 
As we mentioned above, old-age and disability pensions are basically 
insurance-based benefits, and as such fall outside the scope of this paper. 
However, social considerations also play a role in pension increases (e.g. in the 
introduction of the 13th-month pension) or in the awarding of disability 
pensions, and therefore we take a brief look at the situation of pensioners from 
the perspective of redistribution.  
The results of studies investigating the position of pensioners (CSO, 2003; 
Medgyesi et al., 1999) are consistent, in that the average income situation of 
pensioners is somewhat worse than that of the working population. They 
typically belong to the medium-income group, and, compared to the active 
population, there are far fewer pensioners in the bottom or top deciles. Income 
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differences are smaller among pensioners, and poorer pensioners are not so far 
from the poverty line as poor people of an active age.  
Figure 19 below reveals that nearly half of pensioner households are in 
deciles 4 to 7, and far fewer of them are in the lowest or highest deciles than are 
families with children. Therefore, it is typically not the poorest households that 
are reached by the 13th-month pension universally paid to all pensioners, but 
rather those on average income; and, since the amount received is in proportion 
to the household income, the benefit gives more to those who have a higher 
income to begin with.  
Figure 19 Distribution of households with a pensioner head and of households with 
children across income deciles, 2005 
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Source: TÁRSZIM 2005 
Note: the head of a household is the adult with the largest income in the household, 
and we classify the household according to the economic activity of that person. 
 
Gas price subsidy  
The gas price subsidy is an element of the benefits system that is linked 
to consumption, and, in 2004, it amounted to almost HUF 44 billion. This 
benefit, in common with indirect taxes, is rather inefficient, as it creates inverse 
redistribution. It brings greater benefit to the wealthy than to the poor, partly 
because wealthier people use more gas (but their consumption still remains 
within the subsidized band), and partly because poorer households are more 
likely to use some non-subsidized fuel for heating rather than piped gas. This is 
also supported by the study by Szivós (2002), which demonstrated that, in the 
lowest two income deciles, use of traditional fuels is four times the national 
average, and only just over half of those households use piped gas.  
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Figure 20 Average gas price subsidy per household, 2006  
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Source: TÁRSZIM 2005 
 
Redistribution impact of taxes  
In addition to benefits, taxes (direct, indirect and contributions) may also 
have a significant impact on redistribution, as they modify the original income 
of households. Tóth (1997) found that the Hungarian tax system significantly 
reduces income inequalities, as the distribution of the tax burden across the 
deciles of taxpayers is much more concentrated than is the distribution of 
incomes. Focusing on taxpayers, a group that accounts for less than half of the total 
population, the difference between the planned and the actual progressiveness 
of the personal income tax system becomes apparent (Figure 21). The curve that 
illustrates the ratio between calculated tax and gross income shows the tax rate 
as it would be without tax allowances across the various deciles. This varies 
between 17 per cent and 25 per cent in the various groups, which is more or less 
in line with the tax schedule. The implicit tax rate, which shows the ratio 
between actual tax liability (including tax allowances) and gross income, is 
much more progressive and gives more benefit to poorer taxpayer groups.  
The slight increase in the tax rate witnessed in deciles 2 and 3 is due to 
the fact that, according to their declared income, these deciles include the 
majority of entrepreneurs, who are not eligible for employee tax allowance, and 
therefore their effective tax burden is somewhat higher. 
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Figure 21 Gross income and tax liabilities, and the implicit tax rates calculated on the 
basis thereof, 2006 
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Source: TÁRSZIM 2005 
Note: implicit tax rate = actual tax liability/gross income (i.e. including tax allowances); 
calculated tax = tax calculated according to the tax schedule for consolidated taxable 
income + tax paid on separately taxed income (i.e. excluding tax allowances).  
 
In the revenue of the Hungarian state budget, the proportion of VAT is 
about 10–25 per cent higher than that of personal income tax.15 Both tax types 
place a burden on households, but personal income tax is very progressive, 
while VAT has a much flatter distribution across the income deciles (Figure 
22).16 The reason for this is that richer households differ significantly from 
poorer ones in terms of how much they save, rather than how much they 
consume. Another reason why VAT is not a good means of redistribution is that 
goods with preferential VAT (e.g. foodstuffs) are more or less consumed to the 
same extent by poor and rich households, and therefore the preferential rate 
provides nearly the same benefit to both poor and rich households.  
                                                 
15 Benedek et al. (2006). 
16 This, however, is partly due to distortions in the database; for more detail see TÁRKI (2005). 
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Figure 22 Average burden of personal income tax and indirect tax (VAT and excise 
tax) on households in Forints and as a percentage of disposable income, 
2006 
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Source: TÁRSZIM 2005 
 
5. Summary and recommendations 
Welfare expenditure accounts for 62 per cent of total public finances, and 
about one third of this is spent on social services. Leaving aside pensions, the 
largest expenditure item, one quarter of social spending, involves price 
subsidies; the next largest is tax allowances, accounting for about 18 per cent; 
while only 5 per cent of social spending is allocated to means-tested benefits 
targeted at helping the poor.  
The welfare system performs well from the perspective of reducing 
poverty, but it operates at a low efficiency. Although a universal benefit, family 
support reaches its target group relatively well. The level of targeting is 
mediocre in the case of means-tested benefits, such as regular social assistance, 
extraordinary social assistance and the housing benefit. Finally, family tax 
allowance, employee tax allowance and supplementary tax allowance do not 
reach the poorest people, i.e. they are poorly targeted. Although price subsidies 
and the preferential VAT rate do reach the poorer groups, they are inversely 
targeted: they give more to richer households than to poorer ones. The targeting 
of the 13th-month pension is incorrect in two ways: in the first place, it does not 
support the poorest people, and in the second place, it gives more to pensioners 
with a higher income, as it is in proportion to the amount of the pension. 
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The efficiency of redistribution may be improved through the application 
of tools befitting the various goals, by better targeting, and by reducing 
administrative costs. 
 
Targeted cash benefits instead of price subsidies 
It is basically cash benefits that most efficiently fulfil social goals, because 
they enable individual eligible recipients to decide how they wish to spend the 
benefit. Efficiency would improve if socially targeted price subsidies were 
discontinued or replaced with cash benefits. Cash benefits also enable better 
targeting, ensuring that only those in need receive support.  
Consequently, we recommend abolishing the gas price subsidy and 
replacing it with a compensation scheme available only to those living on a low 
income. Although lack of data prevents us from examining the extent of 
redistribution, the same logic applies to medicine price subsidies. The existing 
system provides unjustified and unfair support to certain manufacturers, and 
encourages the consumption of medicines, regardless of actual need. We 
therefore propose that the price subsidy be abolished, and instead cash (or in-
kind) benefits be provided to those in need. We did not review price subsidies in 
the field of transport: here, we recommend that clear targets be identified 
(determining the extent to which subsidies serve social or environmental 
functions), and that the social element be separated and replaced with a 
targeted cash benefit. 
Preferential VAT works in a similar way to price subsidies, and is 
therefore not suited to social goals. As was demonstrated above, the 
distribution of the VAT burden across the income deciles is far from progressive, 
i.e. the bulk of the benefit provided via preferential VAT is enjoyed by the 
better-off groups in society. We believe it would be more efficient to abolish 
socially targeted VAT allowances (e.g. VAT on medicine), and perhaps 
compensate those in need with direct cash or in-kind benefits. 
 
Better targeting of benefits 
In the existing system, in-kind benefits also accomplish significant 
redistribution, but most of them do not help those in need, either because the 
benefits are universally available, or because eligibility is determined 
inappropriately. We recommend a review of the related regulations, and a 
reduction in the annual budgets, especially in the case of home purchase 
benefits, the free public health care benefit and employer-provided benefits that 
serve welfare purposes (e.g. railway ticket contribution).  
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With some cash benefits we found that, contrary to their objective, they 
support groups of average or higher income. An example is the 13th-month 
pension, which does not support the poorest households (since the majority of 
pensioners live in average-income households), and gives more to people on a 
higher income (being in proportion to the amount of the pension). 
Another set of elements in the benefit system that favour wealthier 
people are tax allowances, in particular the family tax allowance. The poorest 
households typically do not have taxable income, and thus do not benefit from 
this allowance. Consequently, we recommend that the employee tax allowance 
be abolished, and that family tax allowance for families with three or more 
children be built into the family support. 
 
Simplified tax system 
The existing personal income tax system includes many exceptions, which 
makes it rather complex and unclear. The efficiency of the tax system could be 
significantly improved by increasing its transparency, which is contingent on 
the simplicity of the tax base. Therefore, we recommend scrapping the 
allowances (including the employee tax allowance) and the special regulations 
pertaining to specific incomes that enjoy preferential treatment (e.g. those of 
primary agricultural producers), and broadening the overall tax base.  
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Appendix 
F1. Types of benefits 
1) Cash benefits fall into three categories:  
1. Insurance-based benefits (linked to contributions) may have fixed amounts, 
or may be based on the amount of previous earnings or contributions. 
This category includes benefits such as GYED, the temporary and regular  
social benefit, or the pregnancy and confinement benefit.  
2.  Non-insurance based benefits fall into two groups: 
(i) universal benefits (e.g. family support, GYES)  
(ii) means-tested or income based benefits (e.g. regular social assistance, 
regular child protection benefit). 
3. The third group includes tax allowances, which increase the net earnings 
of certain social groups by lifting their obligation to pay specific taxes. 
2) The recipients of price subsidies may be the consumer or the producer. In 
this category we identified four major transfers: 
a) price subsidy for medicine and therapeutic aids 
b) gas price subsidies 
c) consumer price subsidies  
d) production benefits and normative support for local transport. 
3) In-kind benefits include, among others, housing benefits, expenditure by 
local government on free public health care, and items covering expenditure 
on higher education, such as benefits for the purchase of lecture notes or for 
student hostel accommodation.  
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F2. Tax-related benefits  
Tax-exempt benefits include the following (where possible, we give the entire 
amount and the number of those eligible): 
− GYES (HUF 48.7 billion; 163,000 eligible people in 2004) and GYET (HUF 13.1 
billion, 47,000 eligible people in 2004); 
− Foster parent benefit (legal minimum: HUF 12,000/month; to professional 
foster parents HUF 105,000/month; number of foster parents was approx. 
5,000 in 2004); 
− Nursing benefit (HUF 8.5 billion in 2004); 
− Social carer benefit, up to HUF 48,000 per year; 
− Part of the vocational training benefit; 
− Stipendium, benefit for textbooks, lecture notes and accommodation paid to 
full-time students at higher educational establishments (approx. HUF 25 
billion in 2004); 
− Cash benefits not covered above, awarded to students by educational 
establishments, local government or the Church; 
− Payment to referees of amateur competitions, up to HUF 5,000 per game and 
up to the monthly minimum wage, if the taxpayer does not wish to deduct 
expenses from such income; 
− Students’ income (e.g. working as librarian, laboratory assistant or teaching 
assistant), up to the minimum wage; 
− Income from prison work (number of prisoners in 2003: 12,464); 
− Revenue from the categories listed above collected from a member state of 
the European Economic Area; 
− Benefits related to the Hungarian Corvin Chain; 
− Income not separately taxed, which is tax exempt pursuant to an 
international treaty established by an act of law or a government decree or on 
the basis of reciprocity, but one that may be recognized in calculating the tax 
liability; 
− Revenue recognized in the consolidated tax base, collected from a member 
state of the European Economic Area, which under the member state’s local 
law is exempt from income tax even if paid to a private person with tax 
residence in the given country;  
− Benefits related to Gold, Diamond, Iron or Ruby diploma certificates, 
awarded on the basis of the higher education act, in amount up to three times 
the minimum wage. 
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The table below lists the main tax-exempt earnings and tax allowances. 
Table F1: Tax allowances with a declared amount of over HUF 10 billion and the 
amounts actually claimed, the number of recipients and amount per capita 
Tax allowances 2006 (plan) 
2005 
(forecast) 
2004  
(actual) 
2003  
(actual) 
 HUF million 
HUF 
million 
HUF 
million persons 
HUF 
‘000/ 
head 
HUF 
million persons 
HUF 
‘000/ 
head 
Employee tax 
allowance and 
supplementary tax 
allowance 
263 470 240 935 238 731 2 877 540 83 240 415 2 956 095 81 
Family allowance* 13 086 79 928 80 749 969 512 83 83 086 1 012 039 82 
Tax allowance for life 
and pension insurance 22 926 22 476 21 695 934 836 23 20 295 981 517 21 
Tax allowance for the 
repayment of housing 
loans  
21 434 22 562 21 778 250 160 87 31 219 269 484 116 
Adult education 3 600 3 530 1 744 78 550 22 
PC lease 4 000 8 000 
16 661 407 960 41 
14 740 270 479 54 
Allowance for 
payment to voluntary 
insurance fund 
-- 10 570 10 193 616 306 17 9 545 624 745 15 
Total 358 167 416 954 416 719   525 141   
Of which: unclaimed tax 
allowance  15 900 29 000 19 759   21 267   
Total 342 267 387 954 396 960   503 874   
* The great difference between 2005 and 2006 is due to the restructuring of the family benefit system. 
Source: Ministry of Finance. 
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F3. Distribution of social benefits  
Table F2: The distribution of social benefits, 2004 
  
Amount 
(HUF billion) 
Ratio 
(per cent) 
As 
percentage 
of GDP 
Cash benefits 1004,5 54,5 5,0 
Insurance-based benefits (excluding pension) 158.9 7.1 0.8 
 Non-insurance based benefits 447,5 24,3 2,2 
 a. Income-independent benefits  342.3 15.2 1.7 
 Of which: family support 185.5 8.3 0.9 
 b. Benefits linked to income certificate  108.7 4.8 0.5 
Tax allowances  398.1 17.7 2.0 
 Of which: employee tax allowance 238.7 10.6 1.2 
In-kind benefits 297.6 13.3 1.5 
Price subsidies 541.5 24.1 2.7 
 Price subsidy for medicine and therapeutic aids  332.0 14.8 1.6 
 Consumer price subsidies 103.8 4.6 0.5 
 
Production support and normative support for local 
transport 61.9 2.8 0.3 
 Gas price subsidy 43.8 2.0 0.2 
Total excluding pensions  1845,3 100,0 9,2 
Pensions* 1 678.9  8.2 
Total including pensions 3524,2  17,4 
* Only pension expenditure related to the Pension Fund 
Source: Ministry of Finance. 
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